THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND IRAN'S ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES: MECHANISMS OF DETERRENCE AND REGIONAL POWER PROJECTION

Abstract

Iran's security policy towards the United States has been changing with the persistent imbalance of conventional military power. This study evaluates the deterrence and regional power projection capabilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in support of this strategy. Using process tracing, qualitative content analysis, and comparative case analysis of Hezbollah, Iranian-aligned groups in Iraq, Iran's role in Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen, the research utilizes open-source evidence from Iran's war in 2026. The framework of Offensive Realism enriches the understanding of the structural IRGC incentives for asymmetric compensation, and the institutionalization of these responses can be explained with Neoclassical Realism. The same standards of evidence are applied to Iranian, American, Israeli, and third-party claims. The results show that IRGC's success is the highest in its power projection, cost imposition, and operational resilience in the region, yet low in reliable and comprehensive deterrence. The results show neither a distinct failure on the Iranian part, nor a clear Iranian success.